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Uptegrove: Copyright Protection

LAW SUMMARY
Copyright Protection: The Force Could Not
Keep Han Solo Alive, but Can It Protect Him
from Authors’ Derivative Works?
MICAH UPTEGROVE*

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past century, fictional characters have become extremely valuable; the Harry Potter films all together, for example, grossed $7.7 billion at
the box office.1 Even this huge sum is dwarfed by Marvel movies, which
have brought in over $9 billion to date.2 While these newer characters are
fascinating, the classics still live on; one of the most memorable fictional
characters of all time is Mickey Mouse, who had his debut in 1928 as Steamboat Willie.3 In the past, Disney has worked diligently to protect its fictional
characters, but copyright law does not offer perpetual protection.4 In fact,
Steamboat Willie would have first entered the public domain in 1956, but
because of Disney’s efforts, he is now protected until 2023.5 The reason for
this extended protection is buried in several acts of Congress, including most
recently the Mickey Mouse Protection Act or, officially, the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (“CTEA”).6 The CTEA is pejoratively referred to as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act as a result of Disney’s
extensive lobbying support designed to prevent its early works from entering
*

B.A., B.S.B.E., University of Missouri, 2013; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2016; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2015–2016. I
am grateful to Professor Erika Lietzan for her feedback and invaluable encouragement.
1. Oliver Gettell, J.K. Rowling’s New Harry Potter Story: Could It See the Big
Screen?, L.A. TIMES (July 8, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/movies/
moviesnow/la-et-mn-jk-rowling-new-harry-potter-story-movie-20140708-story.html.
2. Rohan Patel, The Marvel Cinematic Universe Has Officially Grossed over $9
Billion
Worldwide,
COMICBOOKMOVIE.COM
(Oct.
22,
2015),
http://www.comicbookmovie.com/fansites/KingPatel/news/?a=126180.
3. Steamboat Willie, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0019422/ (last visited
Mar. 28, 2016).
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
5. See Beth Hutchens, Copyrights Last for a Limited Time, At Least in Theory,
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 27, 2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/05/27/copyrightslast-for-a-limited-time-at-least-in-theory/id=17391/. See also Zachary Crockett, How
Mickey Mouse Evades the Public Domain, PRICEONOMICS (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://priceonomics.com/how-mickey-mouse-evades-the-public-domain/.
6. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 287 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012)).
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the public domain.7 The late Sonny Bono introduced the CTEA, which extended copyright protection; his ultimate goal, however, was to extend copyright protection indefinitely.8 Unfortunately for Bono, the Constitution prohibits perpetual copyright protection, a point his wife later conceded before
the House of Representatives.9 The fact that these fictional characters are so
valuable, however, incentivizes companies to try to protect their works in a
variety of different ways.
Going forward, we will likely see companies attempting to further extend the duration of copyright, but constitutional constraints will incentivize
businesses to seek the protection of other areas of law, such as trademarks for
their fictional characters. In the future, we will likely see companies trying to
further extend the duration of copyright, but we will also see different areas
of law being applied to fictional characters.10 One possible example of this
may be how Disney has incorporated Mickey Mouse. Since Meet the Robinsons was released in 2007, Mickey Mouse has appeared at the beginning of
every Walt Disney Animation Studios’ production.11 Disney including this
short film before all of its new films may be in order to establish trademark
protection for the clip.12
There are several differences between the protection of graphical and
literary characters, with those differences being especially profound when
characters are created in one form of media but are then transferred to another.13 A well-known example of this is the Harry Potter series, which consists
of books that were then turned into movies. What happens when a character
in the books is a “flat” character that does not have anything more than a ge7. See Daniel Tencer, ‘Mickey Mouse Protection Act’ Headed for Canada After
Feds ‘Cave’ in Trade Talks: Reports, HUFFINGTON POST CAN. (Feb. 7, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/02/07/mickey-mouse-protection-act_n_
6633502.html; Crockett, supra note 5.
8. 144 CONG. REC. H9951–52 (1998) (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Mary Bono).
9. Id.
10. See Timothy B. Lee, 15 Years Ago, Congress Kept Mickey Mouse Out of the
Public Domain. Will They Do It Again?, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/25/15-years-agocongress-kept-mickey-mouse-out-of-the-public-domain-will-they-do-it-again.
11. See Bill Desowitz, ‘Meet the Robinsons’: Keep Moving Forward at Disney,
ANIMATION
WORLD
NETWORK
(Mar.
30,
2007,
12:00
AM),
http://www.awn.com/animationworld/meet-robinsons-keep-moving-forward-disney;
Beth Barany, Trademark Protection for Fictional Characters, WRITER’S FUN ZONE
(Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.writersfunzone.com/blog/2011/12/23/trademarkprotection-for-fictional-characters/. The animation was modified to better fit the
theme for Tangled, Frozen, and Wreck-It-Ralph but otherwise appeared unaltered.
See TANGLED (Walt Disney Animation Studios 2010); WRECK-IT RALPH (Walt Disney Animation Studios 2012); FROZEN (Walt Disney Animation Studios 2013).
12. See Barany, supra note 11.
13. See Ivan Hoffman, The Protection of Fictional Characters, IVANHOFFMAN,
http://www.ivanhoffman.com/characters.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2016).
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neric personality but is transformed into a “round” character in the movie
series?14 Does the copyright for this new complex character originate in the
book or instead in the later film adaptation?15 These questions can also be
resolved in different ways; notably there is also a difference in preventing
someone from creating and selling copies of another’s work and giving
someone the right to create derivative works.
This Note is meant to address the issues surrounding the rights copyright
holders have in their characters and what rights they should be given. These
existing rights are so valuable that it is likely that major companies such as
Disney are going to continue to try to extend copyright duration; this method
has worked repeatedly in the past to protect their fictional characters.16 The
extension of copyright duration through statutes is an attempt to navigate the
issue that the U.S. Constitution technically only allows for copyrights to be
protected for a “limited time.”17 If companies such as Disney can get a copyright term extension every few decades, they will essentially have created de
facto perpetual copyright duration without violating the language of the Constitution. The right to create derivative works is also protection given by
copyright law and it may be far more valuable to authors who wish to produce their works in a series. The U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions in Warner
Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v. X One X Products and Klinger v. Conan Doyle
Estate, however, seem to create a circuit split that complicates the issue of
when other authors can begin to create derivative works. With copyrights
protecting such a valuable industry there are some who argue for copyright
duration to be extended indefinitely,18 but there are also strong arguments
against perpetual copyright duration premised on the relationship between
copyright protection, competition, and creativity.19
It is difficult to deny that copyright duration has an effect on creativity
and competition, but as long as companies like Disney do not have an alternative method of protecting their fictional characters, they will continue to seek
extended copyright duration. This then raises a question: What is it that
14. How well developed a character is can be extremely important for copyright
protection, but other terms such as “round” or “flat” are often used to describe the
character’s complexity. Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 501–02
(7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 458 (2014).
15. Hoffmann analyzes these questions, but unfortunately the answer is complex
and very case specific. See Hoffman, supra note 13.
16. See Lee, supra note 10.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. Mark Helprin, A Great Idea Lives Forever. Shouldn’t Its Copyright?, N.Y.
TIMES (May 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/opinion/20helprin.html?
ex=1337313600&en=3571064d77055f41&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=per
malink&_r=0.
19. Richard Posner, Do Patent and Copyright Law Restrict Competition and
Creativity Excessively?, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.beckerposner-blog.com/2012/09/do-patent-and-copyright-law-restrict-competition-andcreativity-excessively-posner.html.
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companies like Disney are actually trying to protect, and is there some other
way of protecting that interest without extending copyright protection? This
Note takes the stance that what authors want to protect is the right to the use
of their fictional characters in derivative works, and they would be willing to
forgo fighting for statutory copyright duration extensions in exchange for this
right. This stance is premised on the idea that copyright holders gain little
income from their oldest works, such as the original Sherlock Holmes stories,
but the right to create new movies and stories is extremely valuable.
This Note looks to answer those questions and begins by analyzing the
legal background of copyright protection in the United States in Part II. This
is important because copyright protection has changed greatly since the Constitution was written, and it is possible that some of those changes have created problems that now need to be addressed. Part III discusses the recent developments in areas germane to copyright law as they pertain to fictional
characters. This includes issues concerning what it means to create a derivative work, the right of publicity as it relates to fictional characters, and the
limitations of trademark protection for characters. Part IV contains a discussion analyzing the split in the federal district courts, along with unique challenges associated with corporations as authors and owners of copyrights. Part
IV concludes with a discussion of the constitutional limitations to copyright
duration and proposed changes to copyright law.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part begins with an overview of the history of copyright law in the
United States that, while not comprehensive, is intended to trace the development of copyright law and its application to fictional characters. It then
describes how and when fictional characters are copyrightable in the first
place, explores the concept of derivative work, and expands into a discussion
of the right of publicity and its application to entities other than people. This
Part then concludes with an overview of trademark law and its relevance for
fictional characters.

A. A Brief History of Copyright Law
The United States has a long history of protecting copyrights, with the
first copyright statute passed in Connecticut on January 29, 1783.20 The 1783
statute provided the author of a book or pamphlet the exclusive right to print,
publish, and vend the work in the state for a period of fourteen years from

20. Brian Lee Pelanda, Declarations of Cultural Independence: The Nationalistic Imperative Behind the Passage of Early American Copyright Laws, 58 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 431, 441 (2011).
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first publication.21 In 1788, the U.S. Constitution was ratified and authorized
copyright legislation: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”22 Later, Congress passed the
Copyright Act of 1790, which gave authors of maps, charts, and books the
sole right to print, reprint, publish, and vend their works for fourteen years.23
The author was required to apply for the copyright, and if they were still alive
when the copyright was expiring, he or she could renew the copyright protection one time for an additional fourteen years, totaling twenty-eight years
overall.24 The Copyright Act of 1909 then extended the duration to twentyeight years from the date of publication with the possibility of one renewal of
the same duration for a total of fifty-six years.25
The next major change came with the Copyright Act of 1976 (“Act”),
which extended the copyright duration to the life of the author plus fifty
years.26 Works for hire, anonymous works, and pseudonymous works were
given a copyright term of seventy-five years.27 Works copyrighted before the
promulgation of the Act that had not yet entered the public domain had their
extension term expanded from twenty-eight years to forty-seven years, giving
them an effective copyright term of seventy-five years.28 The Act also expanded the subject matter of copyright, with Section 102 extending protection
to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”29 Qualifying works of authorship were expanded to include
the following: literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic, pictorial, graphic,
sculptural works along with motion pictures and other audiovisual works, and
sound recordings.30 Section 106 granted authors the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, perform, and display the works along with the right to create
derivative works.31
21. Adam Barrett Townshend, Note, Crashing by Design: Toward a Uniform
Standard for Public Place Analysis Under Federal Copyright Law, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2045, 2048 n.11 (2004).
22. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
23. Ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
24. Id.
25. Ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-553, 90 Stat. 2541).
26. Copyright Act of 1976 § 302(a) (as originally enacted) (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012)).
27. Id. § 302(c).
28. Id. § 304(a).
29. Id. §102(a).
30. Id. Architectural works were added to this section in 1990. Architectural
Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701–06, 104 Stat. 5133
(1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2012)).
31. Copyright Act of 1976 § 106.
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The (“CTEA”) further extended the copyright duration for new and existing works.32 Under the CTEA, works with known authors were protected
for the life of the author plus seventy years.33 Works for hire, corporate
works, anonymous works, and pseudonymous works were given protection
for 120 years after creation, or ninety-five years after publication, whichever
occurred earlier.34

B. Copyrighting Fictional Characters
When movies or cartoons are given a copyright, a component of the
copyright serves to protect characters that are sufficiently distinctive.35 Characters that are not distinctive enough for copyright protection fall into the
concept of “scènes à faire,”36 a legal doctrine that prevents an author from
proving copyright infringement by pointing to elements in a work that are
rudimentary or unavoidable given the nature of the work.37 Drunken bums,
talking cats, fire-breathing dragons, and monocle-wearing Prussian officers
that click their heels are all examples of stock characters that would fall under
“scènes à faire.”38
In Gaiman v. McFarlane, the issue regarding which characters are copyrightable was addressed in the context of comic books.39 McFarlane began
publishing the Spawn comic book series in 1992 about the adventures of Al
Simmons, who was deceased but returned to Earth as a Hellspawn.40 McFarlane hired several writers, including Gaiman, to improve the story line;
throughout the process, Gaiman also created several new characters, including Medieval Spawn and Count Nicholas Cogliostro.41 A confrontation developed, and in subsequent litigation, McFarlane made the argument that
Medieval Spawn and Cogliostro were not copyrightable because they were
too undeveloped.42
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit began its analysis by
examining the relevant characters and their similarities and differences.43
The first character is the original Spawn who could be described as a malevolent Superman figure that wears a huge red cape and armor created by a neu32.
33.
34.
35.

Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 287 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012)).
Id. § 302(a).
Id. § 302(c).
Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 597 (8th Cir.

2011).
36. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004).
37. Id. (quoting Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th

Cir. 2003)).
38. Id. at 660.
39. Id. at 648.
40. Id. at 649.
41. Id. at 649–50.
42. Id. at 657.
43. Id.
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ral parasite.44 The second relevant character is Medieval Spawn who rides a
horse, wears armor that is similar to Spawn’s but it is illustrated to look more
like a medieval suit of armor, and speaks in an antiquated form of English.45
The third relevant character is Count Cogliostro, who is a wisdom-toting sage
whose physical characteristics are well described with him appearing similar
to a skinny, old bum with a greyish-yellow, Santa Clause-like beard.46
The Seventh Circuit held that Cogliostro’s “age, obvious phony title
(‘Count’), what he knows and says, his name, and his faintly Mosaic facial
features combine to create a distinctive character.”47 The court noted that the
case of Medieval Spawn appears to be a closer question because the character
does not have a proper name; yet, the Lone Ranger is also distinctive and
does not have a name, so the lack of name cannot be a characteristic that
alone defeats copyright protection.48 The test was then whether Medieval
Spawn was sufficiently different from the original Spawn to be independently
copyrightable as a derivative work.49
The court explained that there are two reasons why a derivative work is
required to be significantly different from the original copyright in order to be
copyrightable.50 The first is to avoid the confusion that would be generated
“if two indistinguishable works were copyrighted.”51 The second is in order
to prevent an author from “making an identical work as the statutory period
was nearing its end, calling it a derivative work, and copyrighting it.”52 The
court concluded that this was not an issue here because “[a] Spawn who talks
medieval and has a knight’s costume would infringe Medieval Spawn, and if
he doesn’t talk medieval and doesn’t look like a knight then he would infringe Spawn.”53 It may seem trivial to point out that a Spawn who wears a
costume would infringe Medieval Spawn, but this case is important because it
lays out the test in the Seventh Circuit for when a fictional character is copyrightable and what is required for another character to be considered a derivative work from the original character.

C. Copyright Protection of Characters in Derivative Works
Copyrightable works moving from one medium to another can produce
complications with regard to when the copyright of each respective work
begins and ends. An important case on this issue is Warner Bros. Entertain44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 657–58.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 661. The court noted that the Lone Ranger actually does have a name –
John Reid – but most of his audience is unaware of it. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 662.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 13

636

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

ment, Inc. v. X One X Products from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit.54
Warner Brothers is the owner of the registered copyrights to the 1939
films The Wizard of Oz and Gone with the Wind.55 While the films were still
in production, publicity materials were independently created featuring the
characters in costume.56 These materials did not conform to the copyright
notice requirements of the time, and so, the works were not protectable by
federal copyright.57 X One X Productions and Art-Nostalgia.com, Inc.
(“AVELA”), the defendant, extracted the images of the famous characters
from the publicity materials and began marketing them on a host of consumer
items and used them as models for various three-dimensional works.58
Warner Brothers sued AVELA, alleging unfair competition and that the
extracted images infringed the films’ copyrights and trademarks.59 AVELA
argued correctly, according to the court, that as a general proposition, the
public was allowed to freely use materials in the public domain, including in
the creation of derivative works based off of the original.60 The caveat was
that this right to freely modify the original work ends when the derivative
work “comes into conflict with a valid copyright.”61 This means:
[I]f material related to certain characters is in the public domain, but
later works covered by copyright add new aspects to those characters,
a work developed from the public domain material infringes the copyrights in the later works to the extent that it incorporates aspects of the
characters developed solely in those later works.62

In order to determine if copyright infringement has occurred, it is necessary to determine the scope of the copyright in the later works, the scope of
the materials in the public domain, and the scope of the derivative works created from the materials in the public domain.63 The Eighth Circuit agreed
with the district court’s conclusion that Dorothy, Tin Man, Cowardly Lion,
and Scarecrow were all sufficiently distinctive to receive copyright protection
from the film.64

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See 644 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 589.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 590.
Id.
Id. at 591, 596.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 597.
Id.
Id.
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The court came to the same conclusion in regard to the characters Scarlett O’Hara and Rhett Butler from Gone with the Wind.65 According to the
court, AVELA correctly argued that the protection for the characters was
limited to incremental changes of character expression that occurred when the
characters were moved to the film from their respective books.66 This had
little value in the instant decision because of the fact that a character as described in a book “anticipates very little” of the character as it is expressed in
the film.67 As an example, the court noted Dashiell Hammett’s description of
Sam Spade, played by Humphrey Bogart in the 1941 film,68 from The Maltese Falcon:
Samuel Spade’s jaw was long and bony, his chin a jutting v under the
more flexible v of his mouth. His nostrils curved back to make another, smaller, v. His yellow-grey eyes were horizontal. The v motif was
picked up again by thickish brows rising outward from twin creases
above a hooked nose, and his pale brown hair grew down—from high
flat temples—in a point on his forehead. He looked rather pleasantly
like a blond satan.69

Warner Brothers noted that the court in Gaiman exclaimed that even after this description, hardly anyone would know what Sam Spade looked like,
“[b]ut everyone knows what Humphrey Bogart looked like.”70 The actors’
portrayals of these characters “appear to rely upon elements of expression far
beyond the dialogue and descriptions in the books.”71 AVELA failed to identify any instance where “the distinctive mannerisms, facial expressions,
voice, or speech patterns” of an actor’s portrayal of a movie character were
anticipated by that character’s description in the book.72 The court found that
for both films, the only images in the public domain were the precise images
contained in the original publicity materials.73
The court then divided AVELA’s products into three categories, the first
being the images or parts of images from the promotional materials that were
transferred to new media, such as a lunch box.74 The court determined this
category did not infringe the copyright of the movie because “Warner Bros.
present[ed] no reasoned argument as to why the reproduction of one smaller
contiguous portion of an image from an item of publicity material, rather than
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
The Maltese Falcon, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0033870/ (last
visited Apr. 11, 2016).
69. Id. (quoting Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2004)).
70. Id. at 597–98 (quoting Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660–61).
71. Id. at 598.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 602.
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the entirety of the image from that item, would add an increment of expression of the film character.”75 The second category consisted of products on
which AVELA had juxtaposed one image from the publicity materials with
either an image from somewhere else in those materials or with a phrase from
the book.76 The court held that combining parts from materials in the public
domain added a novel increment of expression that infringed the copyright of
the corresponding movie.77
The third category consisted of threedimensional products that were created with the publicity materials.78
AVELA indicated that its goal was to create products that the public would
recognize as the film characters, so the court inferred that the details chosen
to create three-dimensional perspective “were chosen to be consistent with
the film characters.”79 Therefore, the court found, the inclusion of additional
details that transformed the two-dimensional images into three-dimensional
figures infringed the copyright of the characters in the film.80
This case is important to copyright law because the Eighth Circuit in
Warner Brothers lays out a very encompassing test for what constitutes a
derivative work. Under the rationale of this case, it seems that if part of a
work remains copyrighted, it is very difficult to use any parts of the work in
the public domain except in the exact format that the work was in when it
entered the public domain.

D. Right of Publicity
Copyright law can create a number of results that are unfavorable to either the author or the public, so some attempts have been made to extend new
areas of law, such as the right of publicity to fictional characters.81 In California, “the right of publicity is both a statutory and a common law right.”82
Originally, the codified right of publicity authorized the recovery of damages

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 603.
Id.
Id. at 604.
Id.
For more information about death and the right of publicity, see Erik W.
Kahn & Pou-I “Bonnie” Lee, “Delebs” and Postmortem Right of Publicity,
LANDSLIDE Vol. 8 No. 3 (2016). For a more in depth analysis of the relationship
between fictional characters and the right of publicity, see Jessica Joshua, Fictional
Characters and the Right of Publicity: Policies, History, and Conflict (Dec. 2009)
(unpublished seminar paper, Chicago-Kent College of Law), http://www.kentlaw.edu/
perritt/courses/seminar/papers%202009%20fall/jessica%20joshua%20Entertainment
%20Law%20Final%20Seminar%20Paper.pdf. For more background, see generally
Dawn H. Dawson, Note, The Final Frontier: Right of Publicity in Fictional Characters, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 635 (2001).
82. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001).
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by any non-consenting living person who had their name, photograph, or
likeness used for commercial purposes.83
In 1984, the California legislature created a new statutory right of publicity that echoed the previous right of publicity statutes but made the right
descendible to the heirs and assignees of the deceased.84 In order for a deceased person’s right of publicity to qualify under the California statute, it is
necessary that the person’s “name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness
has commercial value” at the time of death, regardless of whether the person
used any of the features commercially while alive.85 This transferable right
ceases when there is neither a transferee nor survivor, or after fifty years from
the time of death, whichever occurs sooner.86
In Comedy III Productions v. Gary Saderup, Comedy III was the registered owner of all rights to The Three Stooges, who were all deceased within
the meaning of the statute.87 Saderup created and sold lithographs and Tshirts depicting charcoal drawings of The Three Stooges.88 The Supreme
Court of California stated that when an artist uses a celebrity’s literal depiction or imitation for commercial gain without significant added expression,
the state law interest is to protect the celebrity’s artistic labor over the interests of the imitative artist.89 The rights of the celebrity are not absolute under
the right of publicity statutes; however, their likenesses are not protected for
varying uses, such as sports or political commentary.90
The right of publicity has extended into a transferable right and can protect the fictional personas of groups such as the Three Stooges. The differences and similarities between fictional personas and fictional characters may
be of significance later but even now there may be right of publicity connections to fictional characters when they are portrayed by actors.91 However, as
far as the author is aware this right has not yet been extended to fictional
characters in any jurisdiction.92

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 800 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(h) (West 2016)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 800–01.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 800.
See Hoffman, supra note 13. For more information on actors, fictional characters, and the right of publicity, see Patrick Kabat, From the Next Gen Committee:
Rights of Publicity in Actor-Created Fictional Characters Whose Mask Is It Anyways?, LEVINE SULLIVAN KOCH & SCHULZ, LLP (Aug. 2015),
http://www.lskslaw.com/documents/MLRC%20Aug.%202015%20(00882765).pdf.
92. Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, No. 3:15-cv-01729-LB,
2015 WL 5000102, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015).
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
This Part explores the recent developments in the law surrounding fictional characters and derivative works. First, this Part examines Warner
Brothers as applied in Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, which covers the issue
of derivative works when part of a work is still under copyright protection
and part of the work has entered the public domain. Then, this Part analyzes
the right of publicity and the push by one company to extend the right of publicity to corporations. Finally, this Part surveys the use of trademarks to protect fictional characters by examining DC Comics v. Towle and how trademark protection protects the Batmobile.

A. Creating Derivative Works
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took a seemingly different approach to derivative works in the case of Klinger v. Conan Doyle
Estate, an opinion written by Judge Posner and decided on June 16, 2014,
than it did in Warner Brothers.93 The first Sherlock Holmes story was published in 1887, and the last story written by Arthur Conan Doyle was published in 1927.94 Altogether, Doyle published fifty-six stories and four novels
about the adventures of Sherlock Holmes, with the last ten stories published
between 1923 and 1927.95
The CTEA extended the copyright duration of these stories to ninetyfive years after the original publication date, meaning that the copyright on
these stories would expire between 2018 and 2022.96 However, the stories
and novels published before 1923 have all entered the public domain.97
Klinger created a canon of the Sherlock Holmes books written by Doyle, and
although Klinger did not believe he needed a license, his publisher paid
Doyle $5000 for a copyright license.98 Klinger and a co-editor then decided
to create a sequel and entered into negotiations with a publisher and a distributor.99 The Doyle estate learned of the work in progress and informed the
publisher that the book would require a license, subsequently threatening to
use its contacts to prevent an unlicensed Sherlock Holmes story from being
distributed through the major retailers.100
Klinger then sued the Doyle estate, seeking a declaratory judgment that
he could use the Sherlock Holmes material already in the public domain.101
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See 755 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 458 (2014).
Id. at 497.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 498.
Id.
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The Seventh Circuit found that because the estate had threatened to block
distribution of the book and there was a latent threat to sue for copyright infringement, there was an actual controversy that created jurisdiction to hear
the case.102 Doyle’s estate argued that the suit was premature because the
work was not yet created, and therefore, it would be impossible to determine
whether the work infringed.103
The court determined that prematurity was not an issue in this case because Klinger’s question presented by the declaratory judgment was “whether
he is free to copy the characters of Holmes and Watson as they are depicted
in the stories and novels” that are in the public domain.104 The court stated
that when a story enters the public domain, the story elements, including its
characters, “become fair game” for other authors to use.105 The court then
acknowledged the Warner Brothers case and the rule that the freedom to create new derivative works utilizing material in the public domain ends where
the resulting work comes into conflict with works that are still copyrighted.106
The court then found that, in this case, there was no conflict with any derivative works and the protected material.107
The Doyle estate argued that creativity would be discouraged if copyright protection was not extended in this case, but the court noted that this
argument did not apply here, seeing as Doyle had been dead for eighty-four
years.108 The court stated that extending copyright protection would result in
less material available in the public domain, which would prevent subsequent
authors from creating new stories about popular fictional characters.109 The
court reasoned that extending copyright protection would also discourage
creativity because this would encourage authors to write more stories about
old characters, rather than create new stories about new characters.110 The
estate advanced the hypothetical of a mural that was first drawn and then later
painted, saying that an artist that made the sketch would have less incentive
to perfect the mural if creative copiers had already improved it.111 The court
responded that while allowing the sketch to enter the public domain would
diminish the artist’s incentive to perfect the mural, it would incentivize others
to improve it or create derivative works.112
The Doyle estate advanced the idea of a test that revolved around
whether a character was “flat,” or not fully developed, or “round,” meaning
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 499.
Id. at 499–500.
Id. at 500.
Id.
Id. at 501 (quoting Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d
584, 596 (8th Cir. 2011)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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fully developed.113 “Round” characters continue to evolve, and the estate
argued that these characters are not rounded off until the final story.114 The
Seventh Circuit found this argument unconvincing, suggesting that this argument would presumably allow original trilogy Star Wars characters to not
expire until the copyrights of Episodes I, II, and III expire.115 The court
acknowledged that the Doyle estate may be concerned that another author
would disparage Sherlock Holmes, thereby discouraging others from reading
the Doyle series; but, the court said this issue was essentially trademark dilution, which has “no comparable doctrine of copyright law.”116 The court
rejected Doyle’s arguments and concluded by chiding the specter of what
appeared to be a request for effectively perpetual copyright protection, totaling 135 years, when the Constitution only allowed such protection for a limited time.117

B. Right of Publicity
Right of publicity lawsuits were traditionally only relegated to cases in
which the rights of an actual person were potentially jeopardized, but recent
suits have tried to expand the rights to other entities. In Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony
Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, Micro Virag owned VIRAG, an Italian company
that “was founded in the 1960s as a carpet distributor, and it later expanded
into the field of commercial floorings . . . .”118 Micro Virag sued several divisions of Sony for violating VIRAG’s common law right of publicity and
trademark rights.119
In 2004, VIRAG started sponsoring the Rally of Monza, which is held at
a racetrack where the Formula One Italian Grand Prix is hosted.120 Sony
develops, produces, and distributes the Gran Turismo racecar simulation
games, which have sold over seventy million copies.121 Gran Turismo 5 and
6 contain a simulation of the VIRAG mark on a bridge at the Rally of Monza
racetrack.122 Sony did not attempt to obtain rights to VIRAG’s mark, and
VIRAG has always denied any requests to sponsor other products with the
use of their mark.123 Sony did receive authorization or license to use the
marks of other trademark holders within the game.124 VIRAG alleged that
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. at 502.
Id.
Id. at 503.
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, No. 3:15-cv-01729-LB,
2015 WL 5000102, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *2–3.
124. Id. at *3.
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Sony’s use of the VIRAG mark in the video games did cause and was likely
to cause confusion regarding VIRAG’s sponsorship of the games.125
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed
the claim that Sony violated VIRAG’s common law right of publicity because, under California law, corporations do not have a right of publicity. 126
The court also noted that no court “has held or even suggested that the right
of publicity extends to non-human beings.”127
The few courts that have heard similar arguments have rejected them.
For example, in Eagle’s Eye, Inc. v. Ambler Fashion Shop, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California declined to extend the right of
publicity to a corporation in 1985.128 This is the same conclusion reached by
a Missouri court that also refused to extend the right of publicity to corporations in 1998.129 The court in Virag also analyzed the academic work of Professor Thomas McCarthy, who is opposed to extending the right of publicity
to anyone or anything that is not a real human being.130 Professor McCarthy
clarifies that this belief extends to fictional and cartoon characters and lists
Betty Crocker, the Jolly Green Giant, and Mickey Mouse as three characters
undeserving of a right of publicity.131 Professor McCarthy believes that
whatever exclusive rights these characters have should be found in copyright
and trademark because he believes that right of publicity laws should only
protect humans.132

C. Trademark Protection for Fictional Characters.
In addition to the right of publicity, courts have wrestled with the issue
of whether or not to extend trademark protection to fictional characters. A
trademark can consist of a word, phrase, symbol, and/or design that is used to
identify the source of the goods of one party as distinguishable from all others.133 Some fictional characters, such as Disney’s Pinocchio, are so identifi-

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5 (citing Eagle’s Eye, Inc. v. Ambler Fashion Shop, Inc., 627 F. Supp.
856, 862 (E.D. Pa. 1985)).
129. Id. (citing Bear Foot, Inc. v. Chandler, 965 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998)).
130. Id. (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND
PRIVACY § 4:45 (2d ed. 2015)).
131. Id. at *6 (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 130).
132. Id. (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 130).
133. Trademark, Patent, or Copyright?, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/trademark-basics/trademark-patentor-copyright (last updated Nov. 16, 2015).
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able with the source that they are protected by trademark law even if the work
in which they originated has entered into the public domain.134
Another beloved character, Batman’s Batmobile, has recently been involved in trademark and copyright litigation.135 Since 1941, Batman has protected Gotham City from villains utilizing his trusted Batmobile.136 The
Batmobile is a high-tech automobile that has changed in appearance over the
years but has always served as “Batman’s personal crime-fighting vehicle.”137
In DC Comics v. Towle, Defendant Mark Towle produced and sold replica versions of the Batmobile as it appeared both in the 1966 television show
and in the 1989 film for approximately $90,000 apiece.138 DC Comics, who
owns the rights to the Batmobile, sued Towle for copyright infringement,
trademark infringement, and unfair competition.139 The U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California found that the Batmobile was a character, and as a character, it was subject to copyright protection.140 The district
court relied on several findings including:
[T]hat the Batmobile “is known by one consistent name that identifies
it as Batman’s personal vehicle,” and, although some of its physical
traits have changed over time, several have remained consistent, including its “high-tech gadgets and weaponry,” “bat-like motifs,” and
its jet black color. Additionally, the district court found that the Batmobile is always “depicted as being swift, cunning, strong and elusive,” and is even portrayed as a “superhero” and “Batman’s sidekick,
if not an extension of Batman’s own persona.” 141

The court granted summary judgment to DC Comics, finding that Towle
had infringed DC’s copyrights. The district court also found that Towle had
intentionally used the term “Batmobile” to refer to his replicas and that this
action was done in bad faith to associate his replicas with the Batman productions.142 Towle argued that the Batmobile changed appearance multiple times
and sometimes even “appeared without its signature sleek ‘bat-like’ features,”
but the court noted that a consistent appearance was not as significant as consistent traits and attributes.143 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir134. Walt Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs., 628 F. Supp. 871, 874 (C.D. Cal.
1986); Terms of Use, WALT DISNEY FAM. MUSEUM, http://waltdisney.org/terms-use
(last visited Mar. 14, 2016).
135. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2015).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1017.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1017–18 (quoting DC Comics v. Towle, 989 F. Supp. 2d 948, 967
(C.D. Cal. 2013), aff’d, 802 F.3d 1012).
142. Id. at 1018.
143. Id. at 1022.
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cuit held that the question of whether or not the Batmobile was a copyrighted
character was a question of law and affirmed the trial court’s findings.144
The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the trial court’s rulings with regard to
the trademark infringement, finding that Towle used the Batmobile trademark
in order to take advantage of the pre-existing value of the mark.145 The Ninth
Circuit found that no reasonable juror could have concluded that Towle’s use
of DC Comics’ trademarks were for any reason other than exploiting those
marks.146

IV. DISCUSSION
Copyright protection is still the primary method of providing protection
for fictional characters, but the idea that copyright can protect the individual
characters within a story is a relatively new one. This Part analyzes the differences that are emerging in the federal circuit courts of appeals and explores
the methods of eliminating the conflict between providing incentives to authors to produce new works and adding content to the public domain.

A. A Divergence in Districts
The Klinger and Warner Brothers cases, although seemingly divergent,
may still be capable of reconciliation. Harmony can be achieved if the differences in the opinions are the result of the conclusion that the graphical and
literary characters are treated differently. Take the animated series Teenage
Mutant Ninja Turtles, for example. The comic books were first introduced in
1984,147 and when the first comic book entered the public domain, there was
still a large amount of material, including several animated and live film/TV
adaptations, under copyright protection. Under Klinger, once these characters enter the public domain, anyone would be able to write stories about
them.148 Under Warner Brothers, anyone will be able to use Ninja Turtles
material to create derivative works unless that work comes into conflict with
a valid copyright.149 Warner Brothers held that the juxtaposing of two different images that were otherwise in the public domain infringed on the copy-

144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 1022–23.
Id. at 1026–27.
Id. at 1027.
Douglas C. McGill, Dynamic Duo: Kevin Eastman and Peter Laird; Turning
Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles Into a Monster, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 1988),
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/25/business/dynamic-duo-kevin-eastman-peterlaird-turning-teenage-mutant-ninja-turtles-into.html?pagewanted=all.
148. See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 458 (2014).
149. See Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 596 (8th
Cir. 2011)).
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right of the film if the juxtaposition added a new increment of expression that
was not present in the individual images.150
So, under Warner Brothers, anyone would be free to create copies of the
original Ninja Turtles comic book; but if they attempted to move the pictures
around or create a new comic book depicting the identical characters, they
might be infringing the copyright of the newer works that were still protected.151 If these two cases can be harmonized, then graphical works are seemingly given more protection than literary works. As a result, it would seem
that, taken together, Klinger and Warner Brothers would allow others, upon
expiration of the first copyright, to create literary works about the adventures
of the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, but any attempt to modify or create new
depictions of the Turtles from public domain images could result in copyright
infringement of the newer works if a “new increment of expression” was
added.
Klinger rejects the notion that the copyrights on the characters as portrayed in the original Star Wars trilogy will expire only on expiration of the
copyright for the later-released prequel trilogy.152 However, one question
remains: How is this theory applied? If copyright from the original series
enters the public domain for R2-D2, then what rights does a new author
have? Under Warner Brothers, it would seem that a new author technically
has the right to use the original images of R2-D2, but that the creation of any
derivative works would almost certainly infringe the copyright of the subsequent prequel trilogy.153
Klinger expressed hostility toward a nearly perpetual copyright duration
of 135 years; however, this hostility may be the result of a failure to understand the current intricacies of copyright law.154 For example, Alec Greven
published his New York Times best-selling book How to Talk to Girls at age
nine.155 At the time the book was published, Alec was expected to live another sixty-seven years.156 If he lived to the age of his life expectancy, his
work would end up being protected by copyright for over 137 years: two
years longer than what the Doyle estate was requesting for its series.157 Although most authors will not have such a long life expectancy, this example
illustrates the fact that at least some circumstances where very popular works
will be protected for over 135 years already exist. In light of that fact, judicial reluctance to extend copyright protection past 135 years ignores the reali150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 603.
See id.
See Klinger, 755 F.3d at 502.
See Warner Bros., 644 F.3d at 596.
See Klinger, 755 F.3d at 503.
Mike Celizic, 9-Year-Old Author Reveals Secrets of Picking Up Girls,
TODAY NEWS (Dec. 4, 2008, 9:55 AM), http://www.today.com/id/28049776/ns/todaytoday_news/t/-year-old-author-reveals-secrets-picking-girls/#.VjIExrSjl8E.
156. Actuarial Life Table, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
STATS/table4c6.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2016).
157. Klinger, 755 F.3d at 503.
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ty of the predicted copyright duration for works that are being created right
now.
The court in Klinger argues that extending copyright duration for works
in a series will encourage authors to create stories about the same characters
rather than creating new ones.158 Current copyright laws already protect
works with a known author for life plus seventy years.159 If copyright protection is extended to the life of the author plus 200 years, will that really incentivize an individual author such as J.K. Rowling to create more books about
Harry Potter than she already otherwise would?160 When copyright protection originally only lasted for twenty-eight years, the argument would have
been a lot stronger that an extension would incentivize the author to keep
creating stories about the same characters so as to extend the copyright duration to the end of the author’s life. But, the current copyright duration will
always extend past the author’s lifetime, and so they will be able to reap the
benefits of their copyrights as long as they are alive; this seems like all the
motivation an author would need.161 At this point in time, it seems difficult
158. Id. at 501.
159. Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).
160. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 248–49 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting)

(citations omitted).
In conjunction with official figures on copyright renewals, the CRS Report indicates that only about 2% of copyrights between 55 and 75 years old retain
commercial value—i.e., still generate royalties after that time. But books,
songs, and movies of that vintage still earn about $ 400 million per year in royalties. Hence, (despite declining consumer interest in any given work over
time) one might conservatively estimate that 20 extra years of copyright protection will mean the transfer of several billion extra royalty dollars to holders of
existing copyrights -- copyrights that, together, already will have earned many
billions of dollars in royalty “reward.”

Id.
161. Id. at 254–55 (citations omitted).
No potential author can reasonably believe that he has more than a tiny chance
of writing a classic that will survive commercially long enough for the copyright extension to matter. After all, if, after 55 to 75 years, only 2% of all copyrights retain commercial value, the percentage surviving after 75 years or more
(a typical pre-extension copyright term)—must be far smaller. And any remaining monetary incentive is diminished dramatically by the fact that the relevant royalties will not arrive until 75 years or more into the future . . . . Using
assumptions about the time value of money provided us by a group of economists (including five Nobel prize winners), it seems fair to say that, for example, a 1% likelihood of earning $ 100 annually for 20 years, starting 75 years
into the future, is worth less than seven cents today. What potential Shakespeare, Wharton, or Hemingway would be moved by such a sum? What monetarily motivated Melville would not realize that he could do better for his
grandchildren by putting a few dollars into an interest-bearing bank account?
The Court itself finds no evidence to the contrary.
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to imagine that an author will be more likely to continue a story about the
same characters just because copyright protection is extended ten generations
beyond their death instead of three.162

B. Corporations as the Owners of Copyrights
An exception to this inventive argument is when corporations act as authors. In 2012, Disney purchased the Star Wars franchise for over $4 billion
with the intent to produce a new film every few years.163 Disney, as an immortal entity that can collect revenue until judgment day, now has a lot of
incentive to extend copyright protection to the Star Wars characters for as
long a period of time as possible.164 Let us, for simplicity’s sake, assume that
Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Hope is a work for hire that was published in
1977, which would give the work copyright protection until 2072.165 Today,
Disney still creates new works featuring the characters from this first movie,
and Disney has indicated that it intends to continue to create Star Wars movies for the foreseeable future.166
In this case, if Disney were able to extend the copyright protection of
characters in the original trilogy by simply creating more works about those
characters, it would seem clear that Disney has a tremendous incentive to do
so. Though, with Disney’s estimated budget of $200 million for the newest
Star Wars film,167 it seems that Disney is not trying to create a new work
simply to bolster the copyright protection of the earlier films. What seems
more likely is that consumer expectations drive the economic decision to
spend hundreds of millions of dollars on new films.

Id.
162. See id. at 254 (“And any remaining monetary incentive is diminished dramatically by the fact that the relevant royalties will not arrive until 75 years or more into
the future, when, not the author, but distant heirs, or shareholders in a successor corporation, will receive them.”).
163. Alex Block, Disney to Buy Lucasfilm for $4.05 Billion; New ‘Star Wars’
Movie Set for 2015, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 30, 2012, 12:54 PM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/disney-buy-lucasfilm-405-billion-384448.
164. See Germain Lussier, 20th Century Fox Still Owns Rights to First Six ‘Star
Wars’ Films, Making Original Box Set Difficult, /FILM (Oct. 31, 2012),
http://www.slashfilm.com/20th-century-fox-still-owns-rights-to-first-six-star-warsfilms-making-original-box-set-difficult/. The original purchase of the Star Wars
franchise was not completely straightforward as 20th Century Fox retained some
rights to the franchise. Id.
165. STAR WARS: EPISODE IV – A NEW HOPE (Lucasfilm 1977).
166. Ryan Nakashima, Disney to Make New ‘Star Wars’ Movies, Buy Lucasfilm
for $4.05 Billion from George Lucas, YAHOO! FIN. (Oct. 30, 2012, 8:59 PM),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/disney-star-wars-films-buy-210830937.html.
167. Brent Lang, ‘Star Wars: The Force Awakens’: Counting Down the Records it
Broke, VARIETY (Dec. 20, 2015, 11:14 AM), http://variety.com/2015/film/boxoffice/star-wars-the-force-awakens-records-box-office-1201665770/.
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Han Solo’s character may have been killed in Star Wars: Episode VII The Force Awakens, but that does not mean that the character is not still extremely valuable.168 Disney is also creating a new Han Solo spin-off film that
will come out in 2018.169 This film will feature a younger Han Solo, and it is
possible that Disney will continue to make films about Han Solo for another
hundred years.170 If the Han Solo copyright protection from the first movie
ends in 2072, and the copyright protection for this new film ends in 2113, we
now have a period of forty-one years where some aspects of the Han Solo
character are in the public domain, while other parts of his character are still
under protection. During such time, it is foreseeable that other film producers
might begin to create new films about Han Solo. Trying to follow Klinger
and Warner Brothers would make it almost impossible to determine whether
any of these knock-off creations would violate Disney’s copyright on the
protected work.
The problem may be that neither Klinger nor Warner Brothers deal explicitly with the issue at hand.171 It is clear under established copyright law
that the Han Solo character, as it originally appeared, will eventually be in the
public domain. However, under Warner Brothers, if the knock-off Han Solo
were fashioned in such a way so as to cause the audience to think of the Han
Solo in the remaining Disney movies, the knock-off Han Solo would violate
Disney’s copyright.172
If such is the case, then simply saying that the copyright on the Han Solo character has expired is a gross misstatement of the rights that Disney
holds, because they have essentially been granted the exclusive license to
create derivative works of the original piece.173 Consequently, the only right
granted to the public is to reproduce Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Hope in
the exact form that it was originally introduced. Klinger is similarly unhelpful to our Disney conundrum because the decision was arguably premature,
seeing as the Sherlock Holmes work was not yet finished.174
The takeaway from Klinger seems to be that if someone wants to create
a work that is based in whole or in part on works in the public domain, and
characters in that work are present in works that are still protected, the best
thing the author can do is to seek a declaratory judgment if an actual contro-

168. See STAR WARS: EPISODE VII – THE FORCE AWAKENS (Lucasfilm 2015).
169. Peter Sciretta, ‘Star Wars’ Han Solo Spin-Off Movie to be Directed by ‘The

Lego Movie’ Directors, /FILMS (July 7, 2015), http://www.slashfilm.com/hah-solospinoff-movie/.
170. Id.
171. See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 458 (2014); Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644
F.3d 584, 596 (8th Cir. 2011).
172. See Warner Bros., 644 F.3d at 604.
173. See id. at 602–03.
174. See Klinger, 755 F.3d at 501.
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versy arises that his or her unfinished work will not infringe the materials that
are still copyrighted.175

C. The Constitutional Limitations on Copyright Protection
The Constitution only gives Congress the power to protect the works of
authors for limited times;176 thus, in order for the characters in stories to be
given perpetual protection, the Constitution must either be amended, or a new
form of protection would need to be extended to such characters. Copyright
protection could be extended for a very long period of time, such as 500
years, and it would still theoretically meet the limited times requirement.177
But, there is no reason to think that even this duration would satisfy immortal
entities such as Disney.
However, there are two other potential methods that could be used to
protect fictional characters: trademark protection or an expanded right of
publicity for fictional characters.178 Trademark protection, though, would
only protect characters that are identified with a brand and are actively used
in commerce.179 This could be the reason that Disney now includes a segment of Steamboat Willie before each of its new films.180 The problem with
trademark protection, though, is that it could only be used to protect a limited
number of characters, and a company like Disney would need to have characters like Aladdin trademarked for a brand of chocolate chip cookies, for example, or Simba as the trademark for a light company. But creating new
product lines just to create valid trademarks is far too cumbersome a process
to warrant any serious consideration as a method of protecting fictional characters on any sort of large scale.181
Extending the right of publicity for fictional characters is accompanied
by its share of problems. The biggest problem with extending the right of
publicity to fictional characters is that this form of protection was designed
for real humans and is always tied to the life of the individual.182 As fictional

175. See generally id.
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
177. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 197 (2003) (“[T]he CTEA’s terms,

though longer than the 1976 Act’s terms, are still limited, not perpetual, and therefore
fit within Congress’ discretion.”).
178. See Kathryn M. Foley, Note, Protecting Fictional Characters: Defining the
Elusive Trademark-Copyright Divide, 41 CONN. L. REV. 921, 921 (2009); Samuel J.
Coe, Note, The Story of a Character: Establishing the Limits of Independent Copyright Protection for Literary Characters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1305, 1310 (2011).
179. Foley, supra note 178, at 940.
180. Beth Barany, Trademark Protection for Fictional Characters, WRITER’S FUN
ZONE (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.writersfunzone.com/blog/2011/12/23/trademarkprotection-for-fictional-characters/.
181. See Foley, supra note 178, at 942.
182. Dawson, supra note 81, at 637.
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characters are immortal, extending protection in this case would essentially
be akin to creating a new form of intellectual property that has no duration.
Extending copyright protection by expanding the duration of copyright
is the most practical method of protecting complex fictional characters.183
The question then presents itself: If the copyright duration was extended from
ninety-five years to 150 years for corporate creations, what incentive would
Disney have to create more films about Han Solo? In the immediate future,
this change does not seem to incentivize Disney to create any new movies
about this character because its current copyrights on the character will not
end for a very time. However, what such a change might do is cause Disney
to be willing to invest in new enterprises in light of the long period of time
they will have to recoup their investment. Disney surely considered the current ninety-five-year duration when it acquired the rights to the Star Wars
franchise for over $4 billion.184 This ninety-five period gives Disney a safety
net that would only require them to earn $42 million a year to recover their
investment, assuming that the ninety-five-year duration started at the time of
acquisition and the last work acquired had just been published.185 The reality,
though, is that Disney has far fewer years left of copyright protection for the
previously published Star Wars works.
The approach taken in Warner Brothers strikes a good balance for extending protection for humans, but it could become quite complex in the case
of corporations.186 Under the Warner Brothers approach, corporations have
an incentive to continue to create interesting stories about characters for as
long as it remains financially viable to do so.187 In view of the tremendous
amount of money invested in modern fictional works, it is foreseeable that
most companies would actually utilize this opportunity to continue to create
new and valuable works. Conversely, the Doyle estate was just sitting on its
rights, and this would likely be the approach taken by the estate of any human
author.188 Companies, on the other hand, can continue to create high caliber
works forever, to the continued amusement of their fans.

183. See Jasmina Zecevic, Distinctly Delineated Fictional Characters That Constitute the Story Being Told: Who Are They and Do They Deserve Independent Copyright Protection?, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 365, 396–97 (2006) (discussing reasons why fictional characters should not be offered independent protection).
184. See Block, supra note 163.
185. In reality, this was a much better investment for Disney. because Star Wars:
Episode VII – The Force Awakens grossing over $2 billion in the worldwide box
office. Sam Turner, Yes, Disney Will Keep Milking the Star Wars Cow, DESERET
NEWS
(Apr.
10,
2016,
7:55
AM),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865651939/Yes-Disney-will-keep-milking-theStar-Wars-cow.html?pg=all.
186. See generally Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584
(8th Cir. 2011).
187. See generally id.
188. See generally Lee, supra note 10.
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D. A Proposal for a Modified Copyright Rule
A possible solution could be the following blanket rule: copyright protection extends to the characters of a story so long as there are works in the
series that are still under copyright protection. Under such a rule, as long as
Disney keeps creating Star Wars movies about Han Solo, Disney would never suffer a production that depicts Han Solo in a manner that is contrary to
canon. Consequently, the loss to society might merely be that the public
would never get to witness a version of the film in which Han Solo betrays
the rebel alliance, or another in which Han aspires to become the greatest Jedi
of all time. If both Disney and hundreds of other companies are producing
Han Solo movies, the market will become very complicated, very quickly. If
one of the knock-off derivative films features Han Solo wielding a light saber, then one of the official Disney movies could potentially end up infringing if their Han Solo fights include even one battle with a light saber. So, the
issue becomes this: How much control should society extend to the owner of
a copyrighted series? It would seem that society might be more willing to
give extended protection to a corporation that will continue to entertain by
creating new works than to an estate that will just sit on the works already
created.
In order for a system like this to work, though, it is important that restraints be placed on the company to ensure that products are still being added
to the marketplace. One method of achieving this goal is, following the Han
Solo example above, to start with the law that works of corporate authorship
last ninety-five years. After the end of this period, that work enters the public
domain. This would mitigate the concern that if the work never enters the
public domain, then authors could continue to charge a premium for the work
and restrict the poor from access to many classical works.189 The change
would be that the company then receives the right to create derivative works
based on the characters for a period of time, possibly twenty years.
A short time period like this could be used to ensure that the company is
not just sitting on its rights, but actively creating new content as a method of
maintaining the rights to use the characters in derivative works. This could
theoretically be used by a company in order to preserve the rights to a character such as Han Solo for eternity, so the constitutional limitation protecting
copyrights only for a limited duration will arise. There are two arguments
that could be used to address this issue. The first is that perpetual rights are
not being given, but rather copyright extensions to create derivative works.190
Each respective original and derivative work would still enter into the public
domain after ninety-five years but the right to build on those works would be
maintained by the company. So, even if the protection is classified as copy189. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 250 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
190. See Joshua H. Warmund, Development Agreements Are Vital to Prevent

Disputes over Proprietary Interests in Web Sites, 74-DEC N.Y. ST. B.J. 34, 35
(2002).
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right protection, it is not perpetual protection but rather finite extensions that
can be granted an infinite number of times so long as certain conditions are
met.
The second argument is that the protection that is being extended to the
company is not copyright protection but rather a temporarily exclusive license to create derivative works.191 This argument is supported by the fact
that the original copyright protection laws only extended to the right to print,
publish, and vend the book or pamphlet.192 This idea would still be followed
in the new regime where the author loses those rights at the end of the ninetyfive-year period. What the author then is maintaining is the right to create
derivative works, which is a concept that was not extended to American copyright law until the Act.193 It could be the case that such a right to create
derivative works is not governed by copyright protection as laid out in the
Constitution but is instead simply a right that is now provided to authors
along with copyright protection.194
The loss to society in granting companies the exclusive right to create
derivative works will shrink the public domain because other authors will not
be able to build upon characters such as Han Solo or Harry Potter. The public will be able to build upon the stock characters, though, and the only reason
that an author would want to utilize the previously copyrighted characters is
to build on the success of the original authors. Requiring them to create their
own characters in fact encourages these new authors to be more creative than
simply telling a new story with existing characters previously originating
from another mind.
In essence, this new system would provide balance to the struggle between copyright protection and the public domain. Authors would be encouraged to create new, exciting works about existing characters as long as
they have an interesting story that the public will support by buying movie
tickets, books, or other methods. The original works will all enter the public
domain so they can be enjoyed by anyone, but the rights to modify the works
will be curtailed only as long as the author is actively developing the characters. This means that a company like Disney will eventually have to let some
characters enter the public domain for logistical reasons.
As the number of complex characters in the Star Wars movies exponentially increase, it will become impossible for the company to continue to create new works utilizing all of the characters and still make it profitable to do
so. The rights to some of these characters will then lapse and the public will
be free to make derivative works with them. In order to make sure the company is not just sitting on its rights like the Doyle estate, laws could be estab-

191. See id. at 35–36.
192. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
193. Copyright Act of 1976, ch. 17, § 103, 90 Stat. 2541 (as originally enacted)

(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2012)).
194. Compare id., with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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lished that prevent the derivative rights extension from applying in cases
where the characters are licensed to other entities.

V. CONCLUSION
There is nothing to suggest that companies will not continue to lobby for
longer and longer copyright protection in order to protect their fictional characters. If companies are able to keep extending the copyright duration of the
works they have already created, there are strong arguments that the public
would be deprived because it does not have access to these works that would
otherwise be free or very inexpensive.195 A suitable compromise should be
struck that provides companies with a way to protect the works in which they
have invested so much money, but where the work will eventually enter the
public domain.
Granting companies a renewable license to create derivative works
through their continued creative efforts while leaving the copyright duration
for each work of corporate authorship at ninety-five years seems to be a suitable compromise. This will incentivize companies to continue to create popular derivative works while still granting each work to the public after a fixed
amount of time. This would mean that Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Hope
and all of the subsequent films would enter the public domain after ninetyfive years but Disney could still have the exclusive right to create Han Solo
movies for a set period of time from the last time they created a Han Solo
work. These subsequent Han Solo films would also enter the public domain
after ninety-five years, but the exclusive license to create Han Solo films
would continue as long as Disney continued creating works about the character.
During the brief history of the United States, copyright duration has almost quadrupled works of corporate authorship, and if we continue on this
trajectory, it will not be long before copyright duration exceeds several hundred years. This solution seeks to stop this expansion of copyright duration
by protecting the characters in works that the authors actually cares about in
exchange for the author continuing to create works around the characters they
care about. This will ensure that all works enter the public domain where
they can be enjoyed by all.

195. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 250 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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